Near Field Communication Research Lab Hagenberg

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Software Card Emulation in NFC-enabled Mobile Phones: Great Advantage or Security Nightmare?



University of Applied Sciences Upper Austria, Hagenberg, Austria

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Outline

- Introduction
 - Near Field Communication
 - Secure Element-based Card Emulation
 - Software Card Emulation
- Software Card Emulation
 - Advantages
 - Disadvantages
- Conclusion





Near Field Communication

- Advancement of proximity RFID and smartcard technology
- Idea: Touch an object to trigger an action
- 3 operating modes
 - Peer-to-peer mode
 - Reader/writer mode
 - Card emulation mode

(3)





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NFC in a Mobile Phone

(1)


(2)

Application processor – NFC interface

Peer-to-peer mode, Reader/writer mode, Software card emulation

Secure element – NFC interface

Secure card emulation



Application processor – Secure element (via NFC controller)

Secure card emulation (internal access to secure element)

Application processor – Secure element (direct)

Secure card emulation (internal access to secure element)





Card Emulation

- NFC device emulates a contactless smartcard
 - Access control token
 - Credit card
 - **–** ...
- Compatibility to existing proximity smartcard infrastructure
- Emulation by
 - Smartcard chip (secure element)
 - Software on application processor





Secure Element-based Card Emulation

- Secure Element
 - Dedicated secure element chip
 - UICC ("SIM card")
 - SD memory card
- Same high security level as other smartcards
 - Secure storage
 - Secure execution environment
 - Hardware-based cryptographic operations






Attacks on Card Emulation and Smartcards

- Example: Relay Attack
 - Communication between smartcard and reader can be relayed over longer distances
 - Proxy reader in proximity of the smartcard
 - Proxy card emulator in proximity of the actual reader
 - Proxy card emulator and proxy reader communicate over an alternative channel (e.g. Bluetooth)





Software card emulation



- No secure element
- Smartcard commands handled by software on the application processor





Availability of Software Card Emulation

- All BlackBerry NFC mobile phones
- CyanogenMod 9 after-market firmware for Android devices
- Dedicated NFC reader devices (e.g. ACR 122U)
- Dedicated card emulators (Proxmark, ...)





Advantages of Software Card Emulation

- Card emulation is often associated with high revenue applications (payment, ticketing, access control)
 - Everyone wants to develop these applications

BUT:

- Secure element is under tight control of handset manufacturer/trusted service manager/mobile network operator
- Competing applications not likely to be allowed to coexist on one secure element
- High cost to get applications onto a secure element (due to limited space and expensive certification)





Advantages of Software Card Emulation

- Software card emulation opens card emulation applications to average developers
 - Complex secure element is not needed
- Anybody can develop applications based on existing reader infrastructure
- Software card emulation can be used as an alternative to peer-topeer mode
 - Peer-to-peer mode is still not (fully) supported by many NFC devices
 - Many smartcard readers for PCs do not support peer-to-peer mode
 - Reader/writer mode is well supported on the PC platform through PC/SC (peer-to-peer mode is not!)
 - Software stack for reader/writer mode is less complex than that of peer-topeer mode
- Great chance for others than the "big players" to create innovative NFC applications






Disadvantages of Software Card Emulation

- Application processor is less secure than secure element (no secure storage, no trusted execution environment)
 - Difficult to store sensitive data
 - Possible interference by other applications
 - Maybe okay for some applications (e.g. ticketing)
 - Problematic with other applications (e.g. payment, access control)
- Software card emulation devices as attack platform
 - Card emulator for relay attacks
 - Mobile phones have form factor expected for NFC/contactless transactions
 - Mobile phones have network connectivity for the relay channel





Cloud-based Secure Element







Conclusion

- Software card emulation is a great opportunity for developers
 - Breaks the barrier of secure element-based solutions
 - Easy integration into existing contactless smartcard systems
 - Easier to use than peer-to-peer mode
- Significant risk
 - Developers may be lazy with securing their applications and data
 - Devices may be used as platform for relay attacks

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Thank You!

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http://congress.nfc-research.at/

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